Does anyone know, I heard about the legislation in Massachusetts where everyone in the State is meant to have coverage but I think those who are in work need to purchase it through work - not sure if that's true or how exactly it works. What would happen to someone who moved to Mass without a job and needed some kind of healthcare, would the State pick up the cost? Or would they assess your net worth and make a decison on that or what would they do?
I'm currently living in Massachusetts (NB: Massachusetts is
not a State...

), but even I'm not totally clear on the current plan, so
a quick trip to wikipedia was in order.
There's no requirement to purchase through employment (employers with more than 10 employees who do not provide coverage are taxed by the Commonwealth).
Those who earn less than the federal poverty line but do not qualify for Medicaid can obtain a policy at effectively no charge from the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector (which basically works out bulk insurance deals with private insurers); those who make up to 300% of the poverty line pay for their policies on a means-tested basis. Failure to be insured (or to obtain a waiver for either religious objection to health insurance or a lack of affordable policies) results in various tax penalties; in '07 it was merely the loss of personal income exemption, while from '08 onwards half of the cheapest annual premium will be added to your income tax bill.
I think this system is an improvement over both the normal US system and the more state-controlled system of the UK, but the basic idea is better implemented by Singapore (the Netherlands served as the model for the Massachusetts system; the jury is still out on whether it's effective or not).
IMO, the system the USA should move to would have the individual coverage mandate with employer-provided health coverage strongly discouraged. Eradication of employer-provided health coverage is the most important step to reform of the entire system: every problem is traceable to that response to WWII-era wage controls. EPHC adversely affects workforce mobility, reduces insurability for those outside of the EPHC system, and prevents a proper market from developing. Ending the tax-favored status of EPHC would be a great start (i.e. considering health insurance premiums as taxable income).
Going along with this, various regulations requiring minimum coverages, like regulations setting a minimum price for anything (e.g. minimum wage), should be abolished: at best such regulations have no effect on things (if they happen to be perfectly calibrated such that they are right where the market decided the price/offering should be)... otherwise they have the effect of preventing people from getting coverage (for minimum wages, read being employed) or even more perversely may reduce the level of coverage being received (for minimum wages, read wages received). The mandate should only require a fairly high deductible (probably $5k, maybe even $10k) coverage for a catastrophic illness.
Beyond this, routine care/preventive maintenance should be held to be the responsibility of the individual, though aggregate health-care expenditure (comprising the catastrophic insurance premium plus the cost of drugs, preventive/routine care, spending up to the deductible, plus applicable contributions to a savings account earmarked for paying health expenses) would be limited to a set percentage of income (first by making anything above say 10% of AGI tax deductible and anything above say 15% of after-tax income earn a tax credit).
Individuals are generally more capable of making health decisions and weighing the cost/benefit equation than a bureaucrat.
The coverage mandate is, of course, problematic for an advocate of the free market. However, health insurance suffers from a major information asymmetry: you know far more about your body's health than a prospective insurer does. Since the decision to buy insurance is fundamentally a bet that you will make sufficient claims (and thus the decision not to buy insurance is a bet that you won't need to make sufficient claims), it follows that it is eminently rational for, for example, most men under 30 to forego health insurance as they're unlikely to need it and the premium money is basically being thrown away. The effect of the pull-out of those guys is that the prices for everybody else have to increase which means that a few more people decide that the expected value of their claims is far exceeded by the expected value of the premiums and pull out which continues the cycle. The solution is thus to prevent the healthiest from opting out. The options then basically become an NHS-style system (with a near-monopoly for the state in the provision of and payment for health services), a system with a government monopoly on catastrophic care coverage (IINM, Germany and France basically follow that model), and a system with private (regulated) insurance and a mandate to purchase. Of those three, the one that allows for the freest system (even if it involves the government purchasing private insurance for those with less than a certain ability to pay) is the latter and thus I support it, as the different coverage options reduce the one-size-fits-all models offered by the former two (and by the employer-provided system currently in the States).